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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of consumption externalities on the “Pigou-
vian ranking,” according to which the second-best level of public good provi-
sion is smaller than the first-best level. Consumption externalities introduce
exceptions to the Pigouvian ranking. Two necessary and sufficient conditions
for reversal of the Pigouvian ranking are identified, when preferences for pri-
vate goods (Cobb-Douglas) and the public good are weakly separable: (i)
consumption generates a negative externality, (ii) utility is not too concave
in the subutility of private goods. If preferences are strongly separable in
the public good, the Pigouvian ranking is reversed if and only if the second-
best consumption price is lower than the corrective (Pigouvian) consumption
price.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of consumption externalities on the first-
best and second-best levels of public good provision. In particular, this work
addresses the question of whether the second-best level of the public good
is lower or greater than the first-best level (level issue) when consumption
generates either positive or negative externalities. It is often argued that the
second-best optimal level of public good provision is below the first-best level
as long as the government’s expenditures have to be financed by distortionary
taxes (“Pigouvian ranking”), as suggested by Pigou (1947). This analysis
demonstrates that consumption externalities can introduce exceptions to the
Pigouvian ranking.
The importance of consumption externalities has been stressed exten-
sively in the literature. Important references include Brekke and Howarth
(2002), Easterlin (1995), Frank (1999), and Johansson-Stenman (2002, 2006),
and Solnik and Hemenway (2005). It has previously been shown that con-
sumption externalities shed important light on our understanding of issues
like happiness, economic growth, asset pricing, or optimal (redistributive)
taxation. With the exception of Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming), how-
ever, no paper has addressed the impact of consumption externalities on the
first-best and second-best levels of public good provision. This is the focus
of the present paper.
An extensive literature discusses the Pigouvian ranking, and exceptions to
it.1 These papers show exceptions to the classic second-best result, where the
second-best level of the public good is greater than the first-best level (“rever-
sal of the Pigouvian ranking”). The exceptions center upon three arguments.
1Atkinson and Stern (1974), Bartolome´ (2001), Batina and Ihori (2005), Chang (2000),
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Gaube (2000, 2005), King (1986), Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971), Wildasin (1984), Wilson (1991).
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First, public goods may have desirable consequences for the income distri-
bution (King 1986, Batina 1990, Gaube 2000). Second, complementarities
between the public good and a taxed private good may rise public spending
beyond the first-best level (Diamond and Mirrlees 1971, Atkinson and Stern
1974, King 1986, Batina 1990). Third, a rise in public good provision implies
that a larger portion of resources is transferred from the distorted private
sector to the undistorted public sector (Wilson 1991b). All of these effects
lower the social marginal cost of a public good, which, in turn, potentially
gives rise to a reversal of the Pigouvian ranking. Sufficient conditions for
such a reversal to occur are discussed in Chang (2000).
This paper identifies a further exception to the Pigouvian ranking, based
on consumption externalities. In a simple economy with homogeneous house-
holds, preferences over private goods (consumption and leisure) and the pub-
lic good are weakly separable. Subutility of private goods is specified by a
Cobb-Douglas function, where consumption generates an externality. Within
this simple “generalizes Cobb-Douglas” framework, this paper identifies two
necessary and sufficient conditions for reversal of the Pigouvian ranking.
First, this paper shows that the Pigouvian ranking always holds in case of
a positive consumption externality. A negative consumption externality is
a necessary condition for reversal of the Pigouvian ranking. In this case, a
consumption tax functions both as a device for raising revenue and as an
instrument for correcting the negative consumption externality. Second, re-
versal of the Pigouvian ranking is only possible when the utility function
is not too concave in subutility of the private goods. In this case, a nega-
tive consumption externality tends to raise the marginal rate of substitution
of the public for a private good. For a given rate of transformation, the
Samuelson condition requires a rise of the second-best level of the public
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good (above the first-best level). As a special case, if the utility function is
linear in subutility of the private goods (strong separability), the Pigouvian
ranking is reversed if and only if the second-best consumption price is lower
than the corrective (Pigouvian) consumption price.
With the exception of Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming), consump-
tion externalities and the Pigouvian ranking have not been connected in the
previous literature. This paper offers necessary and sufficient conditions for
reversal of the Pigouvian ranking, when individual consumption generates an
externality. Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming) demonstrate that Pigou-
vian reversal occurs whenever (i) the marginal excess burden of a consump-
tion tax is negative, or the second-best consumption price falls short of the
corrective (Pigouvian) one. However, they only consider a strongly separable
utility function, and they only consider a negative consumption externality.
The present analysis partially extends the analysis of Wendner and Goul-
der (forthcoming) to more general preferences.2 In a CES (Cobb-Douglas)
framework without externalities, Wilson (1991a) demonstrates that a rever-
sal of the Pigouvian ranking is not possible when preferences for the private
good can be represented by a CES utility function, and the ad valorem tax
does not exceed 100 %. Here, we show that such a reversal is possible in the
presence of a negative consumption externality.
Section 2 of this paper defines the representative consumer economy. Sec-
tion 3 derives and discusses the first order conditions for socially optimal,
first-best, and second-best allocations. Section 4 considers the impact of
consumption externalities on the first-best and second-best levels of public
good provision. All results of the analysis are stated in Section 4. Section 5
2At the same time, Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming) do not restrict preferences for
private goods to the class of Cobb-Douglas functions. Also, Wendner and Goulder (forth-
coming) focus on the relationship between the marginal excess burden and the Pigouvian
ranking. Such considerations are not covered in the present study.
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concludes, and proofs of two lemmas are shown in the appendix.
2 A Representative Consumer Economy
We consider an economy with many (h) homogeneous households. A repre-
sentative household has preferences over consumption, c, leisure, l, average
consumption, c¯, and a pure public good, G. The public good enters the
household’s utility function, U , in a weakly separable way:
U = U(u(c, l, c¯), G) , (1)
where U is increasing in u(.) and G, concave, and UGG < 0. Consumption
imposes an externality on other households via average consumption. If uc¯ >
0, individual utility rises in average consumption. In this case, consumption
imposes a positive network externality.3 If uc¯ < 0, individual consumption
poses a negative externality on other households.
Keeping up with the Joneses preferences represent a specific example
of (1). In this case, utility is derived from consumption, leisure, and from
relative consumption, r:
r ≡ c
c¯
, (2)
where uc¯ < 0. This specific negative consumption externality is discussed
frequently in the literature.4
Functional Specification. Subutility function u is specified as Cobb-Douglas
3Partial derivatives are denoted as follows. For some function f(.) and variables x, y,
fx ≡ ∂f(.)/∂x, fxy ≡ ∂2f(.)/(∂x∂y); u1 ≡ ∂u(.)/∂c, u2 ≡ ∂u(.)/∂l, u3 ≡ ∂u(.)/∂c¯,
uc ≡ u1(.) + u3(.).
4Prominent examples include Alpizar et al. (2005), Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002,
2006), Solnick and Hemenway (1998, 2005), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005),
McBride (2001).
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function:
u(c, l, c¯) = w(cˆ, l) = cˆα l1−α , cˆ ≡ c1/(1−γ) c¯−γ/(1−γ) = c rγ/(1−γ) . (3)
The strength of the consumption externality is measured by the parameter
γ. If γ = 0, average consumption does not enter preferences. If, however,
γ > 0 (γ < 0), there is a negative (positive) consumption externality.
The interpretation of parameter γ is illustrated for an important case:
relative consumption. In this case, if γ > 0, utility function (3) represents
keeping up with the Joneses preferences. That is, households derive utility
from relative (above-average) consumption. In particular, γ represents the
marginal degree of positionality (see Alpizar 2005, and Johansson-Stenman
2002).5 For example, if γ = 0.1, 10% of marginal utility of consumption
comes from increased relative consumption, whereas 90% stems from in-
creased absolute consumption (holding fixed the level of relative consump-
tion).
The production side of the economy is, summarized in a fixed-coefficients
transformation function, using labor as the only input:
h (y − l)− h c−G = 0 . (4)
The total amount of time (labor and leisure) available to each household is
denoted by y, and the total quantity of the consumption good produced is
C = h c. The units of G and C are chosen such that the constant marginal
rate of transformation of C for G is equal to one.
5Consider w˜(c, l, r) ≡ w(cˆ, l). The marginal degree of positionality is given by: γ =
(∂w˜(.)/∂r) (∂r/∂c)/[(∂w˜(.)/∂c) + (∂w˜(.)/∂r) (∂r/∂c)].
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3 Centralized and Decentralized Allocations
Here, we characterize both a social optimum and decentralized first-best and
second-best equilibria. In the following section, we use this characterization
to derive the relationships between consumption externalities and first-best
and second-best levels of public good provision.
Social Optimum. A social planner chooses {c, l, G} according to a sym-
metric utilitarian welfare function. The planner takes fully into account the
externality generated by individual consumption. Since each household has
the same preferences, the optimum will be described by full equality. Thus,
the social planner accounts for: c¯ = c, and cˆ = c. The social welfare func-
tion becomes: W = hU(u(c, l, c), G). Consumption, leisure, and public good
provision are derived from:
{c, l, G} = argmax
c, l, G
{W |h (y − l)− h c−G = 0} .
The social optimum is characterized by the following first order conditions:
uc(c, l)
ul(c, l)
=
α l
(1− α) c = 1 , (5)
hUG(u(.), G)
Uu(u(.), G)ul(.)
= 1 =
hUG(u(.), G)
Uu(u(.), G)uc(.)
, (6)
and by the resource constraint. Equation (5) requires the marginal rate of
substitution of consumption for leisure to equal the marginal rate of transfor-
mation (unity). Equation (6) is the Samuelson rule for optimal public goods
supply, requiring the equality between the sum (over all households) of the
marginal rate of substitution of the public good for leisure and the marginal
rate of transformation (unity).
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First-best solution. In a competitive equilibrium, firms maximize profits sub-
ject to the production constraint (4) and prices. The wage rate (numeraire)
is set equal to one.6 Let (p, pG) be the producer prices of C and G measured
in labor units. The only price system that is compatible with competitive,
cost minimizing producer prices is: p = 1, pG = 1, where the producer prices
equal the marginal costs.
In the first-best case, the government can implement lump-sum taxes t
(lump-sum transfers, if t < 0), and a consumption tax τ . The consumer
price of the private good, in terms of labor units, is q = 1 + τ . Then, a
household’s budget constraint is y− t−q c− l = 0. As the public good enters
the utility function U in a weakly way, the Marshallian demands of c and l
are independent of G. In this case, the optimization problem can be decom-
posed into two separate maximization problems, a household’s problem, and
a government’s problem.
With some abuse of notation, we can write u(.) = u(cˆ, l). The household’s
problem consists of choosing respectively c and l:
{c, l} ≡ argmax
c, l
{u(cˆ, l) |y − t− q c− l = 0} .
The first order condition for the competitive equilibrium is:
ucˆ(cˆ, l)
ul(cˆ, l)
cˆc = q . (7)
As all households have the same preferences, in equilibrium, the first order
condition becomes:(
ucˆ(cˆ, l)
ul(cˆ, l)
cˆc
)
|c¯=c = α l
(1− α) c
1
(1− γ) = q . (8)
6The problem can be equivalently restated with a wage tax instead of a consumption
tax. Common practice in the literature, however, is to adopt the commodity taxation
model in which labor (leisure) is taken to be the numeraire. See, e.g., Atkinson and Stern
(1974), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming).
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Suppose γ > 0 (γ < 0). Then, due to the consumption externality, the
marginal rate of substitution of c for l is higher (lower) as compared to the
social optimum. In case of a negative (positive) consumption externality, a
household is prepared to give up more (less) leisure for one marginal unit
of consumption. This result is very intuitive. Consider the case of keeping
up with the Joneses preferences. In this case, γ > 0, and households like
above average consumption. Thus, they are prepared to give up more (than
optimal) leisure for one marginal unit of consumption.
By comparing (8) with (5), the corrective (Pigouvian) tax rate becomes:
τˆ = γ/(1− γ) , (9)
or, equivalently, qˆ ≡ 1/(1 − γ). The corrective tax rate corresponds to the
marginal social damage of a household’s rise in consumption. In case of a
positive consumption externality, γ < 0, and the corrective tax rate becomes
negative, in which case τˆ represents a corrective subsidy.
In the first-best, the government’s problem — with a lump-sum tax avail-
able — consists of choosing {t, G}:
{t, G} ≡ argmax
t, G
{U(v(qˆ, y − t), G) |h t+ h (qˆ − 1) c(qˆ, y − t) = G} ,
where v denotes the indirect (sub)utility function. Notice that, from the
government’s point of view, per capita consumption, c¯, is no longer exogenous
(and hence does not show up in the indirect utility and Marshallian demand
functions in the government’s problem). The resulting first order condition
Uu(u(.), G
∗)
UG(u(.), G∗)
v(qˆ, 1)
h ζ
= 1 , where ζ ≡ 1− (qˆ − 1) c(qˆ, 1) , (10)
and the government budget constraint, h t+h (qˆ−1) c(qˆ, y−t) = G, determine
the first-best level of public good provision, G∗, and the optimal lump-sum
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tax (transfer), t∗.7 If the revenue from the corrective consumption tax equals
the funds required to finance the first-best level of the public good, then
the lump-sum tax equals zero: t∗ = 0. If, however, the revenue from the
corrective consumption tax is lower (higher) than the revenue required to
finance the first-best level of the public good, then t∗ > 0 (t∗ < 0).
Lemma 1 (Indirect utility and marginal utility of labor)
vy(qˆ, y − t) = v(qˆ, 1) = ul(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t)) ζ .
The proof of Lemma 1 is given in the appendix. Lemma 1 allows for express-
ing first order condition (10) in a useful way, as shown below.
Second-best solution. In the second-best case, no lump-sum taxes or trans-
fers are available. The only instrument available to the government is a con-
sumption tax. With a consumption tax in place, the household’s problem
becomes:
{c, l} ≡ argmax
c, l
{u(cˆ, l) |y − q c− l = 0} .
For a given tax rate τ , the first order condition describing a second-best
equilibrium is:
ucˆ(cˆ, l)
ul(cˆ, l)
cˆc = q . (11)
Again, in equilibrium, as all households have the same preferences, the first
order condition becomes:(
ucˆ(cˆ, l)
ul(cˆ, l)
cˆc
)
|c¯=c = α l
(1− α) c
1
(1− γ) = q . (12)
The government’s problem in the second-best case consists of choosing
{τ, G}, or, equivalently {q, G}:
{q, G} ≡ argmax
q,G
{U(v(q, y), G) |h (q − 1) c(q, y) = G} .
7Notice that in equilibrium, cˆ = c, and u(cˆ, l) = u(c, l) is homothetic. Thus, v(qˆ, y) is
homogeneous of degree one in y, and vy(qˆ, y) = v(qˆ, 1).
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Let R(q, y) = (q−1) c(q, y) denote the total tax revenue, and Rq(q, y) denote
the marginal tax revenue. The resulting first order condition,
Uu(v(q, y), G
∗∗)
UG(v(q, y), G∗∗)
−vq(q, y)
hRq(q, y)
= 1 (13)
where Rq(q, y) ≡ (q − 1) cq(q, y) + c(q, y) ,
together with the government budget constraint, h (q−1) c(q, y) = G, deter-
mine the second-best level of public good provision, G∗∗, and the associated
second-best consumption tax rate, τ , equivalently, the second-best consumer
price q.
Lemma 2
−vq(q, y)
hRq(q, y)
=
ul(c(q, y), l(q, y))
h
q
qˆ
.
Lemma 2, which is proven in the appendix, allows for re-expressing first order
condition (13) in a useful way below.
4 Externalities and Pigouvian Ranking
In the literature, it is often claimed that — due to distortionary effects of
taxation — the second-best level of public good provision is lower than the
first-best level: G∗∗ < G∗. This claim is frequently called “Pigouvian rank-
ing.”
In this section, we compare the first-best and second-best levels of public
good provision for an economy with consumption externalities. We show
that — for the generalized Cobb-Douglas utility function — whether the
Pigouvian ranking holds or not is related to whether q > qˆ or not.
Proposition 1 If t∗ = 0, the first-best and second-best allocations coincide,
and G∗ = G∗∗.
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Proof. Employing Lemmas 1 and 2, we can restate the two first order
conditions (10) and (13):
hUG(v(qˆ, y − t∗), G∗)
Uu(v(qˆ, y − t∗), G∗) = ul(c(qˆ, y − t
∗), l(qˆ, y − t∗))
= uc(c(qˆ, y − t∗), l(qˆ, y − t∗)) , (10’)
hUG(v(q, y), G
∗∗)
Uu(v(q, y), G∗∗)
= ul(c(q, y), l(q, y))
q
qˆ
= uc(c(q, y), l(q, y)) . (13’)
If t∗ = 0 in the optimum, then q = qˆ. In this case the right hand sides of
both first order conditions are equal. Thus, the left hand sides must be equal
as well. As, on the left hand sides, indirect utilities are equal, it follows that
G∗ = G∗∗. ‖
If t∗ = 0, demand for the public good is such that the corrective revenue
equals the cost of optimal public good provision. In this case, prices and
income are equal in the first-best and second-best allocations. Hence, G∗ =
G∗∗.
Remark. The case where t∗ = 0 is only possible when there is a negative
consumption externality. Only if γ > 0 is there a positive revenue from
corrective taxation. In case of a positive consumption externality, however,
consumption is to be subsidized in the first-best optimum. That is, if γ < 0,
the government needs funds for financing both the corrective subsidy and the
public good, hence, t∗ > 0.
Proposition 2 Suppose UuG ≥ 0. Then, in case of a positive consumption
externality, the Pigouvian ranking always holds: G∗ > G∗∗.
Proof. The proof is given in three steps.
Step 1. The first-best allocation coincides with the social optimum. Given
specification (3), the first-best allocation does not depend on the external-
ity (that is, on γ). In particular, the right hand side of (10’) becomes
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αα (1 − α)1−α. The right hand side of (13’) equals αα (1 − α)1−α[q/qˆ]1−α.
As q > qˆ, the right hand side of (13’) exceeds the right hand side of (10’).
Therefore, the left hand side of the second-best equation (13’) exceeds the
left hand side of the first-best equation (10’).
Step 2. By assumption, Uu UGG−UG UuG < 0, and Uu UuG−UG Uuu ≥ 0. As a
consequence, the marginal rate of substitution UG/Uu(.) is strictly declining
in G and is non-declining in u(.).
Step 3. By definition of the first-best optimum, v(qˆ, y − t∗) ≥ v(q, y). In
order for UG/Uu(.) to be smaller in first best than in second best — which is
required, as the right hand side of (13’) exceeds the right hand side of (10’)
— G∗ must exceed G∗∗. ‖
The interpretation of this result is straightforward. Consumption introduces
a positive externality. Taxation of consumption strengthens the distortion
further. In this setting, the Pigouvian ranking always holds.
In case of a negative consumption externality, the Pigouvian holds if
q > qˆ, but it may fail to hold if q < qˆ.
Proposition 3 (Pigouvian Ranking) If q > qˆ, the Pigouvian ranking al-
ways holds: G∗∗ < G∗.
Proof. This proof essentially follows the one of Proposition 2. If q > qˆ, the
right hand side of (13’) exceeds the right hand side of (10’). Therefore, the
left hand side of the second best (13’) is larger than the left hand side of the
first best (10’). As v(q, y) ≤ v(qˆ, y − t∗), the only way the left hand side of
(13’) can be larger than the left hand side of (10’) is: G∗∗ < G∗. ‖
Again, if q > qˆ, financing of the public good by distortionary taxation makes
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the second-best level of public good provision fall short of the first-best one.
Wilson (1991) shows a special case of Proposition 3: γ = 0. In a Cobb-
Douglas economy without a consumption externality, the Pigouvian ranking
always holds. That is, if q > 1 = qˆ, then G∗∗ < G∗.
In case of a negative consumption externality, when q < qˆ, Pigouvian
reversal (G∗∗ > G∗) can possibly occur. In order to delineate all possible
cases, we first introduce some additional notation. Denote the “marginal
rates of substitution” in the left hand sides of (10’) and (13’) respectively by
µ(v∗, G∗) and µ(v∗∗, G∗∗). Next, denote the marginal utilities of consumption
in the right hand sides of (10’) and (13’) respectively by λ∗(qˆ, y − t∗) and
λ∗∗(q, qˆ, y)8. Finally, define the following two differences:
∆µ(q, qˆ, y, t∗, G∗) = µ(v∗, G∗)− µ(v∗∗, G∗) ,
∆λ(q, qˆ, y, t∗) = λ∗(qˆ, y − t∗)− λ∗∗(q, qˆ, y) .
With this notation at hand9, we can formulate the results regarding Pigou-
vian reversal.
Proposition 4 (Reversal of Pigouvian Ranking)
Suppose q < qˆ. If ∆λ(.) > ∆µ(.), then G∗ < G∗∗.
Proof. If q < qˆ, then ∆λ(.) = λ∗(.)−λ∗∗(.) = [αα (1−α)1−α][1−(q/qˆ)1−α] >
0. Therefore, first order conditions (10’) and (13’) require: µ(v∗, G∗) >
µ(v∗∗, G∗∗). By definition, v∗ > v∗∗. Therefore, ∆µ(.) ≥ 0. If it were the
case that ∆λ(.) = ∆µ(.), then both (10’) and (13’) would be fulfilled for the
given, common G∗. If, however, ∆λ(.) > ∆µ(.), µ(v∗∗, G) is to be lowered
(or µ(v∗, G) is to be raised) in order to increase ∆µ(.) to the level equal to
8Clearly, the marginal rates of substitution of G for c in the first-best and second-best
cases are respectively given by µ(v∗, G∗)/λ∗ and µ(v∗∗, G∗∗)/λ∗∗.
9Notice that ∆µ(.) is not the difference between the left hand sides of (10’) and (13’),
while ∆λ(.) represents the difference between the right hand sides of (10’) and (13’).
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∆λ(.). Notice that µ(.) is strictly declining in G. Thus, to increase ∆µ(.), G∗
is to be lowered or G∗∗ is to be increased, or both. In all cases, G∗∗ > G∗. ‖
To illustrate Proposition (4), we analyze the effects of a rise in γ, holding
fixed q. We start at an initial situation where q = qˆ, and G∗∗ = G∗. First,
rewrite the Samuelson condition (13’) in the following way:
h
UG(v(q, y), G
∗∗)
Uu(v(q, y), G∗∗)uc(c(q, y), l(q, y))
=
µ(v(q, y), G∗∗)
λ∗∗(q, qˆ, y)
= 1 , (13”)
which requires the (sum over all households of the) marginal rate of substi-
tution of G for c (mGc) to equal the marginal rate of transformation (unity).
A rise in γ has no impact on G∗, and it raises qˆ, such that q < qˆ. As a conse-
quence, a rise in γ lowers both v(q, y), and uc(q, y) = α
α (1−α)1−α (q/qˆ)1−α.
For a given level of G∗∗, these two declines have opposing effects on the
marginal rate of substitution. The mGc rises, as uc(.) declines. However, the
mGc may decline, as v(.) falls (and µ(.) was shown to depend non-negatively
on v(.)). Whether, for a given level of G∗∗, the total effect on mGc is positive
or negative depends on the respective strengths of these opposing effects.
Two cases emerge.
Case 1. The impact of the marginal utility of consumption dominates. In
this case, the mGc increases, for a given value of G
∗∗. The Samuelson condi-
tion (13”) then requires a rise in production of the public good and a reduc-
tion in production of the consumption good. As a consequence, G∗∗ > G∗.
Two remarks are in order. First, suppose, γ = 0. If G∗∗ > 0, then q > 1
in order to finance the public good. But then, q > qˆ = 1/(1 − γ) = 1.
Therefore, without a consumption externality, q < qˆ is not a possibility, and
Pigouvian reversal cannot occur.
Second, suppose µ(.) is independent of v(.), that is, Uuu = 0. In this case,
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the impact of the marginal utility of consumption always dominates, and we
can state the following corollary.
Corollary 1 (Strong Separability) Suppose U(u,G) = u(.) + f(G), with
fG(G) > 0, fGG(G) < 0. Then, q < qˆ ⇔ G∗ < G∗∗ .
Proof. With strong separability, the Samuelson conditions become:
[h fG(G
∗∗)/u∗∗c (.)] = 1 = [h fG(G
∗)/u∗c(.)]. It follows:
h fG(G
∗∗)
αα (1− α)1−α (q/qˆ)1−α =
h fG(G
∗)
αα (1− α)1−α ⇔ fG(G
∗∗) = (q/qˆ)1−α fG(G∗) .
From q < qˆ it follows: fG(G
∗∗) < fG(G∗) ⇔ G∗∗ > G∗, where the last
inequality follows from fGG(G) < 0. ‖
Corollary 1 is a special case of Proposition 4. It represents a result already
shown by Wendner and Goulder (forthcoming). If UuG = Uuu = 0, then the
Pigouvian ranking is reversed if and only if q < qˆ.
Case 2. The impact of (indirect) subutility dominates. As indirect
subutility declines in the second-best situation, the mGc decreases, for a
given value of G∗∗. The Samuelson condition (13”) then requires a decline
in the production of the public good and a rise in the production of the
consumption good. As a consequence, G∗∗ < G∗. That is, the result of Case
1 — reversal of the Pigouvian ranking — does not extend to the case where
Uu(.) is sufficiently sensitive with respect to a change in indirect utility, and
we can state Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Suppose q < qˆ. If ∆λ(.) ≤ ∆µ(.), then G∗∗ ≤ G∗.
The corollary follows directly from Proposition 4. In order to lower ∆µ(.),
either G∗ needs to be raised or G∗∗ needs to be lowered, or both. In all cases,
G∗∗ ≤ G∗.
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5 Conclusions
In the literature, it is often claimed that the second-best level of public good
provision is lower than the first-best level, due to distortionary effects of
taxation. This claim is frequently called Pigouvian ranking.
This paper demonstrates that consumption externalities may give rise to
a reversal of the Pigouvian ranking. In particular, this paper identifies two
necessary and sufficient conditions for a reversal of the Pigouvian ranking to
occur, in the framework of a generalized Cobb-Douglas economy with homo-
geneous households. First, consumption generates a negative externality. In
case of a positive consumption externality, a reversal of the Pigouvian rank-
ing cannot occur (in the employed framework). Second, the partial derivative
Uu(u(c, l), G) must be “sufficiently insensitive” with respect to changes in the
subutility function u(.), as made precise in Proposition 4.
A specific case was discussed: Uuu = 0. In the presence of a negative
consumption externality, a reversal of the Pigouvian ranking always occurs
when q < qˆ, where qˆ and q are respectively the corrective (first-best) and
second-best consumption prices. This case occurs whenever the preference for
the public good is low (determining q) relative to the negative consumption
externality (determining qˆ).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. In equilibrium (c¯ = c), observe that
vy(qˆ, y − t) = uc(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t)) cy(qˆ, y − t)
+ ul(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t)) ly(qˆ, y − t)
= ul(.) ×
(
uc(.)
ul(.)
cy(qˆ, y − t) + ly(qˆ, y − t)
)
= ul(.) [1 cy(qˆ, y − t) + ly(qˆ, y − t)] ,
where the last line follows from first order conditions (5) — the marginal rate
od substitution is unity in the first best. By homotheticity of the Marshallian
demand functions (in equilibrium), cy(qˆ, y − t) = c(qˆ, 1), and ly(qˆ, y − t) =
l(qˆ, 1). Thus,
vy(qˆ, y − t) = ul(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t)) [c(qˆ, 1) + l(qˆ, 1)]
= ul(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t))
× [c(qˆ, 1) + l(qˆ, 1) + 1− (qˆ c(qˆ, 1) + l(qˆ, 1))]
= ul(c(qˆ, y − t), l(qˆ, y − t)) ζ ,
where ζ ≡ [1− (qˆ − 1) c(qˆ, 1)] . ‖
Proof of Lemma 2.
Rq(q, y) = (q−1) cq(q, y)+c(q, y) = c(q, y) [q cq(q, y)/c(q, y)+1]− cq(q, y).
For a Cobb-Douglas function, the price elasticity of uncompensated demand
equals (minus) unity, i.e., Rq(q, y) = −cq(q, y) > 0. In equilibrium (c¯ = c):
vq(q, y) =uc(c, l) cq(q, y) + ul(c, l) lq(q, y)
=uc(c, l) cq(q, y)
=ul(c, l) cq(q, y)
uc(c, l)
ul(c, l)
=ul(c, l) cq(q, y) q (1− γ)
=ul(c, l) cq(q, y) q/qˆ ,
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where the second line uses the fact that lq = 0 for a Cobb-Douglas utility
function, the fourth line follows from first order condition (12)10, and the last
line makes use of the definition of the corrective consumer price (9).
−vq(q, y)
hRq(q, y)
=
−vq(q, y)
−h cq(q, y) =
ul(.) cq(q, y) q/qˆ
h cq(q, y)
=
ul(.) q
h qˆ
. ‖
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